COMPETITION BETWEEN BANK SYARIAH INDONESIA AND BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA: EVIDENCE FROM A GAME THEORY ANALYSIS

Abstract

Differences between Islamic and conventional banking systems create complex competitive dynamics, particularly in terms of profitability, efficiency, and intermediation stability, thus requiring an analytical approach capable of explaining strategic interactions in a measurable way. This study aims to analyze the competitive strategies between Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI) and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) by comparing murabahah-based financing and interest-based lending using a game theory approach. The method employed is a descriptive-quantitative approach using a two-person zero-sum game model based on secondary data from 2025 financial statements, with key indicators including Return on Equity (ROE), Operating Expenses to Operating Income (BOPO), and intermediation ratios (FDR and LDR). The analysis is conducted through payoff matrix construction and the determination of optimal strategies using maximin and minimax methods. The results indicate that equilibrium is achieved when BSI adopts a murabahah-based intermediation strategy and BRI applies an efficiency strategy, with a game value of 0. Empirically, BRI outperforms in profitability and efficiency (ROE 18.86%; BOPO 71.5%), while BSI demonstrates stronger intermediation stability (FDR 84% within the ideal range). These findings reveal a trade-off between profitability and efficiency in interest-based systems and stability and risk management in murabahah, where each bank optimizes its relative advantage without achieving absolute dominance.